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Abstract
In enhancing a proposal by Luhmann, this contribution shows that it is
possible to locate different types of systems between ‘face-to-face-interaction’
and ‘society’: groups, organizations, families and protest movements. The
common ground of these is that they use membership to attribute persons to
the system or not. However, they differ fundamentally in regard to how they
understand membership. In contrast to Luhmann's differentiation between
interaction, organization and society, it is not only possible to imagine
different types of interlocking systems but also coequal combinations of and
transitions between the different types of social systems.
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1 | INTRODUCTION—BEYOND
THE SCHEME OF INTERACTION,
ORGANIZATION AND SOCIETY
In Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, few schemas have
attained such prominence as the differentiation between
the three system levels of interaction, organization and
society. In his article ‘Interaction, Organization, Society’,
published in the mid-1970s in German and translated to
English in 1982, Luhmann asserted that this
differentiation allowed the emergence or development of
an already ‘highly complex conception of social reality’
(Luhmann, 1982, p. 88; for the first treatment of this
differentiation, see Luhmann, 1972a: 144ff.). In his book
Social Systems, which appeared in the mid-1980s in
German (Luhmann, 1984; for the English translation,
Luhmann, 1995b), he retained the differentiation
between interaction, organization and society, despite
revisions undertaken with the theory, and even ‘enno-
bled’ it in one of the few visual graphics that he ever
produced (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 2). Luhmann deployed
this tripartite differentiation in the mid-1990s in Theory
of Society,1 even if the casual introduction of ‘protest
movement’ suggests that he could very well have been
considering a modification of this threefold schema (see
also Luhmann, 2013, pp. 132, 154).2
But even if this threefold distinction between interac-
tion, organization and society is repeated as a matter of
course in works that convey introductions or overviews
of systems theory (see, e.g., Nassehi, 2005; Seidl, 2005),
many have pointed out—including systems theoreticians
as well—that many social phenomena cannot be fit
neatly into the trinity of interaction, organization and
society. How can we, following an early query inspired
by the sociology of groups, integrate cliques of friends, or
1See Luhmann, 1997 for the German original, and
Luhmann, 2012b, 2013 for the English translation.
2In his theory of society, Luhmann treats interaction and organization
as ‘types’ ‘of freely formed social systems’, in order to later address
protest movements in discussions of similar length to those for
interaction and organization. He postulated, however, that the ‘present
status of research does not allow them [protest movements] be
considered a separate mode of dealing with double contingency on a
level with interactions and organizations’ (Luhmann, 2013, p. 132).
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groups of acquaintances, into this scheme (see also
Neidhardt, 1979, 1983; Tyrell, 1983a; Willke, 1978)? How
can families be categorized meaningfully in the scheme if
we consider that they rely powerfully upon interaction
yet do not presuppose the permanent presence of all
family members in the interaction (see also Tyrell, 1979;
Tyrell, 1983b)? What should we do with movements that,
as is well known, differ from organizations in that they
cannot make decisions regarding membership, which
means that the behaviour of movement adherents cannot
be conditioned by means of formulated membership con-
ditions (see also Neidhardt, 1985)? From the perspective
of systems theory, should we avoid conceiving of
networks as a substitute for the concept of a system, pre-
ferring instead to view it as a special type of social system
(see also Teubner, 1993)? To name a few more possible
social systems, could we not also understand nation-
states, professions or religious communities as social
systems?
It is striking that these proposed expansions of the list
of social systems have either (in the case of the group)
not caught on in systems theory or (in the case of protest
movements) have not led to a modification of the three-
fold distinction of interaction, organization and society.
This seems all the more surprising, given that Niklas
Luhmann—at least in his early works—was prepared to
‘fork out’ the concept of a system for a broad number of
social phenomena. If we always observe the formation of
social systems whenever the actions of multiple people
are meaningfully related to one another, then we can
understand why Luhmann felt that procedures (see also
Luhmann, 1969, p. 39), discussions (Luhmann, 1971:
326ff.), conflicts (see also Luhmann, 1975b: 68ff.) or
contact systems (see also Luhmann, 2005a: 360) fulfil the
criteria of a social system.
Yet the question at hand remains, why has the diverse
array of expansive proposals not generated fundamental
irritations in the tripartite distinction between interac-
tion, organization and society?
1.1 | Argumentation strategies to save
the threefold model
There are three strategies of argumentation that are being
used to preserve the ‘purity’ of the interaction, organiza-
tion and society scheme. The first strategy is to take
proposals to expand the notion of social systems to
include groups, families, movements, nation-states or
professions and to dissolve them into one of the three
types of social systems. A clique of friends is then
presented either as a number of repeated interactions or
as a sort of mini-organization that can impose formal
membership demands (on the idea of groups as
‘interaction accumulations’, see Luhmann, 2008a:
21/3d27fC5). Movements are attributed to the political
system and thereby situated at the level of society (see
also Japp, 1986). The family is considered a societal
subsystem—such as politics, economics or science—
followed by a succinct statement that this societal family
system is the only societal subsystem that consists of mil-
lions of small systems (see also Luhmann, 2005c).3
The second strategy of rescue consists of admitting
that there are phenomena such as groups, movements
and networks that escape the tripartite model but that
they cannot be granted the status of a social system. In
this case, there is an assumption that every social phe-
nomenon need not be understood as communication that
entails the formation of a system in which interrelated
selections differentiate themselves. Although it is difficult
to deny that ‘actions of several persons are meaningfully
interrelated and are thus, in their very interconnected-
ness, marked off from an environment’ (Luhmann, 1982,
p. 70), it can be argued that it is not possible (yet) to show
how they reproduce themselves as autonomous social
systems.
The third strategy of rescue refers to the fact that of
course the tripartite model cannot be used to claim that
all social systems between interaction and society can be
understood yet that the analytical distinction between
interaction, organization and society is superior to all
other proposals. The ‘theory of social systems’ can,
following this argument, ‘explain social reality with
recourse to the three types, their autonomy and their
interdependencies’ (Baraldi, 1997, p. 178, my translation).
According to this suggestion, it would only be possible to
define a compact theory of society by limiting it to
interaction, organization and society.4 The threefold list,
according to this contention, is superior, ‘in terms of the-
oretical aesthetics’, to a fourfold list comprised of interac-
tion, group, organization and society, and even more so
when it comes to hierarchically nonsorted lists with sev-
eral systems that must be located between interaction
3An interesting question here is whether both love and the family are
independent systems and how they behave in relation to one another as
functional systems. Leupold (1983, p. 299) highlights, for example, that
love ‘cannot escape the logic of functional differentiation. Like all
media-shaped manipulations of communicative problems, [this logic]
constitutes, in the process of media formation, its own social system
which appears as a functional system alongside those in which love is
no longer possible now’ (my translation).
4This line of argument may admit that Luhmann conceived of the three
types of interaction, organization and society as rather pragmatic for
research purposes and did not issue a ‘claim of completeness’
(Tyrell, 1983a: p. 77; my translation), yet theoretically convincing
observations can only be made with a hierarchically organized list of
three types.
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and society. But of course, the question remains as to
whether (and if yes, how much) consideration should be
paid to ‘aesthetic theorizing’ in the development of a the-
ory of society (Luhmann, 2013, p. 154).
These arguments for retaining the tripartite model
were therefore successful because proposals for groups,
movements and families, or professions and networks
were usually presented as individual recommendations
for a social system. In his programmatic essay, ‘Interac-
tion, Organization, and Society’, Luhmann offered an
integration into the discussion of sociological theory, yet
he also presented a theory of society based upon the
distinction between levels, described the process of inter-
twining the different levels and pointed out the richness
of this approach using the social model of ‘conflict’.
However, later proposals for social systems remained
largely limited to discussing whether or not single cases
of networks, groups, movements or friendships were
social systems.5 To put it briefly, however plausible the
proposals for new social systems may have been, each
new article seemed to announce, ‘Here, I've got another
one’.6
1.2 | The objective of this article
This article intends to point out how the differentiation
among the levels of interaction, organization and society
could be expanded in such a way that social phenomena
such as group, movement and family can find a place
within it, thereby allowing the development of a more
complex, historically comparative theory of society.7 To
this end, I have chosen an approach that is unusual, at
least for a scholarly article. This article closely follows
Luhmann's article ‘Interaction, Organization, and Soci-
ety’, and attempts—often with references to Luhmann's
arguments elsewhere—to show which additional insights
are gained not only by locating organizations between
the levels of interaction and society but also by allowing
other social systems such as groups, movements or
families.
This article of course cannot provide detailed descrip-
tions of groups, movements, families and organizations
as social systems. However, Section 2 presents a brief
characterization of the respective system types. To define
the stated social phenomena, the argument is developed
that membership is suitable as a characteristic not only
for the determination of organizations but also for the
determination of groups, movements and families.
Although the definition of persons as members or non-
members is what these social systems have in common,
the different types of social systems (groups, movements,
organizations and families) can be distinguished from
each other by the different disposition options with
regard to membership.
Section 3 briefly alludes to how the notion of mem-
bership can be used to explain how groups, organizations,
movements and families historically differentiated them-
selves. I argue there, in an admittedly greatly simplified
manner, that not only organizations but also groups,
movements and (nuclear) families have developed as
independent social systems only with the transition from
a stratified to a functionally differentiated society. I argue
that this social differentiation into different social
systems between interaction and society generates certain
follow-up problems. Groups, movements, families and
organizations—as social systems—differentiate them-
selves not only from interaction on the one hand and
society on the other but also from each other. Using the
example of family businesses, social movement organiza-
tions or groups of friends composed of different families,
we can then observe what happens when different system
logics collide.
One existing strength of Luhmann's level-based differ-
entiation of interaction, organization and society is that it
facilitates an analysis of the nesting of systems of differ-
ent sizes into each other, for example, interactions in
organizations, or organizations in functionally differenti-
ated societies. Section 4 will show that groups, move-
ments, organizations and families can also nest within
each other. We need to consider not only groups in
organizations, organizations in movements or groups in
movements but also organizations formed by groups of
friends or organizations that try to initiate movements in
order to influence public opinion. In contrast to the level-
5This is all the more surprising because, at least in the German-
speaking world, many relevant authors have generally dealt with
several social systems between interaction and society
(e.g., Neidhardt, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1985; Tyrell, 1979, 1983a, 1983b).
However, it is striking that the respective propositions are always
introduced in separate articles that typically do not refer to one another.
6This reminds us slightly of the discussion about societal subsystems, in
which titles such as ‘Diakonie [a Protestant social welfare organization
in Germany] as a Social System’ (see Starnietzke, 1996), ‘Journalism as
a Social System’ (see Blöbaum, 1994) and ‘The Military as a Social
System’ (see Schubert, 2001) proffer additions to the list of functional
systems.
7We can also refer to Luhmann, who expresses the notion that ‘a
moment of functional differentiation lies on a transverse (vertical) axis’
is inherent in the ‘pulling apart of society/organization/simple systems.’
Because this note can be found under the keyword ‘group’, one can
assume that this means not only differentiation on the transverse axis of
society (functional systems) but that this differentiation can also be
assumed at the level between interaction and society. Luhmann
explicitly mentions that differentiation on the transverse axis should not
be confused with ‘the simple system/subsystem distinction’ (e.g., groups
in organizations or organizations in movements) (Luhmann, 2008a:
21/3d27fl; my translation).
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based differentiation of interaction, organization and
society, groups, movements, organizations and families
can be imagined not only to be nested within each other
but also to be combinations and transitions between the
different social systems of largely equal rank.
In Section 5, I examine the advantages of this model
compared with the aforementioned ‘rescue strategies’. I
argue that a differentiation between different social
systems is more likely to lead to an understanding of the
group, organization, movement, and family than to an
understanding of the phenomena either as an accumula-
tion of interactions, as different varieties of organizations,
or as subsystems of larger societal subsystems such as
politics or economics.
This article—and this must be emphasized
explicitly—neither provides a theory of social systems
between interaction and society nor can it offer a detailed
description of the largely parallel differentiation of
groups, organizations, movements and families as social
systems in the transition from a stratified to a function-
ally differentiated society. Instead, this article examines
how we can open up an entire series of research perspec-
tives on the interrelationship of group, organization,
movement and family. But in response to the question of
whether this approach will be successful, we could para-
phrase Luhmann: This ‘can only prove itself by means of
research’ (Luhmann, 1975a, p. 20; my translation).
2 | TYPES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
BETWEEN INTERACTION AND
SOCIETY—A DIFFERENTIATED
CONCEPT OF MEMBERSHIP
Theoretically and aesthetically, the simplest way to
construct a model of different levels is to locate only one
system on each level. In this case, the level can be deter-
mined via the corresponding system type, and the respec-
tive system type can be related to the other system types
via level differentiation. But Luhmann's differentiation of
interaction, organization and society—and this is often
overlooked—already conceives of the idea that different
system types are plausible on one level; after all, at the
level of society, different macrolevel subsystems with very
different logics exist: law, politics, economics, religion or
science.8 My argument now is that at the level between
interaction and society, different types of systems have
also developed. Unlike the subsystems located at the soci-
etal macrolevel, each of which is based on the principle
of inclusion—in principle, anyone can sue and be sued
(law system), and anyone can buy and sell (economic sys-
tem)—the system types between interaction and society
are based on the possibility of distinguishing between
members and nonmembers.
If in the following discussion the possibility of attrib-
uting persons to a social system (or not) through their
memberships and communications is determined as a
commonality of social systems between interaction and
society, then Luhmann's narrow understanding of mem-
bership must be modified (see the first treatments of this
in Martens, 1997, p. 282). Luhmann introduces member-
ship only as a central criterion for defining organizations.
However, it is striking that everyday language speaks of
members not only of organizations but also of groups,
movements, families, professions and networks. It is said
that members of a group of young people who have set a
car on fire are probably members of a politically
motivated movement and that parents must ensure that
younger family members do not hang out on the streets
at night. They are members of professions who look after
the young people and turn the members of groups, move-
ments and families into respected members of society
(or more precisely of the ‘community’).
Of course, the everyday use of a term alone does not
suggest that it should also be used for the sociological
definition of social systems. But the use of the
membership concept for a multitude of social phenom-
ena can be interpreted as an indication that, as Bettina
Mahlert (2015) puts it, there are a multitude of
membership-based social systems. It is a characteristic
not only of organizations but of other social systems as
well that the attribution of a communication as belong-
ing to a system is dependent on whether or not a person
is regarded as a member. People can be ‘identification
points of communication’, ‘addresses for communication’
and ‘units of attribution’ not only in organizations but
also in families, movements, organizations and, to a
greater extent, in professions or classes (see
Luhmann, 2005c, p. 194).
But even if we open our eyes to the fact that not just
organizations, but also groups, movements and families,
identify persons as members and thus make communica-
tions attributable to them, we still need an explanation as
to why these are different social systems with different
logics. In the following, I will show that although all
groups, movements, organizations and families identify
persons who belong (or do not belong) as members, the
memberships of these people to the respective social sys-
tems are handled differently. This results not only in
8In this respect, the gatekeepers would have to justify the distinction
between interaction—organization—society, which is why different
system types do indeed exist at the level of society, but only one system
type is supposed to have developed at any one time at the ‘lower’ or
‘middle’ level.
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different forms of demarcation for the respective system
types, which is obvious, but also in different forms of
communication through which the different social sys-
tems reproduce themselves.
2.1 | Organizations
Most organizational researchers of various theoretical
orientations regard membership—the decision about a
group of people whose decisions are perceived as the
organization's decisions—as a characteristic of organiza-
tions (see, e.g., Caplow, 1964: 1f.). In systems theory,
however, membership is the central determinant of orga-
nizations, not just one among many. According to
Luhmann, organizations are always formed ‘if it can be
presumed that a decision can be made about joining and
leaving the system’ (Luhmann, 2017, p. 205; see also
Luhmann, 1982, p. 75).
The organization can therefore decide who belongs to
a company, an administration, a political party or a
sports club and who does not.9 And more seriously, it can
decide who should no longer belong to it because he or
she no longer follows the rules of the organization. The
organization creates limits within which the members
(and only the members) have to submit to the rules of
the organization, and there is a permanent threat that
the member has to leave the organization if s/he does not
follow the rules. In organizations, decisions about the
entry and exit of individuals—the determination of
memberships—are a central instrument for establishing
compliant behaviour on the part of their members.
Through the possibility of conditioning
membership—that is, making behaviour an expectation
for everyone, with the threat of terminating membership
should someone step out of line—organizations can
develop decision communication as a system-specific
form of communication (see Luhmann, 2002, p. 160).10
This does not mean that all communication within orga-
nizations takes the form of decision communication.
Organizations often wildly debate, criticize, and imagine.
But the peculiarity is that the conditioning of the mem-
bership can turn any communication into a decision com-
munication. Thus, communication in organizations
differs from communication in movements, families and
groups, in which decisions are made, but in which deci-
sion communication cannot be recursively linked in the
same form.
2.2 | Movement
Systems theory has found it difficult to define movements
as a social system and has therefore—independently of
other sociological movement research—narrowed down
movements to protest movements (Luhmann, 2008b,
pp. 125–129; Luhmann, 2013, p. 157; see also Japp, 1993:
230ff. or Hellmann, 1998: 500ff. following Luhmann).11
This narrow-mindedness certainly has the advantage that
it manages to determine the systemic character of move-
ments by means of protest communication—that is, com-
munications that are addressed ‘to others’ and remind
them of ‘their’ responsibility—and thus provides a clear
criterion of demarcation from, for example, fashions,
trends or scholarly schools of thought. Of course, protest
communication also occurs in groups, in families or in
organizations, but only in movements does protest serve
as a ‘catalyst in the formation of a system of its own’
(Luhmann, 2008b, p. 126). Protest, as a central element
of the system-building process, can then also explain why
politics in particular offers itself as an addressee for pro-
test communication. In contrast to business, science or
religion, we can assume that politics is particularly well
suited as an addressee for protests, even about undesir-
able developments in science, business or religion.
Luhmann remarked that with a ‘more narrow con-
cept of the protest movement’, he was able to capture
‘broad areas of the phenomenon of the social movement’,
yet only ‘broad areas’ (Luhmann, 2008b, p. 125). But that
leaves the question of how social phenomena can be
described, which, although they have a high structural
similarity to protest movements, cannot be primarily
defined by protest communication.12 Thus, religious
9This of course presupposes the willingness of the people to also want to
become members of this organization. On the special problems of
organizations that forcibly recruit their members, see recently
Kühl, 2016.
10Luhmann stated early on (1973, p. 44) that the formal organization is
an ‘evolutionary achievement’ that enabled decision-making processes
to become reflexive in nature.
11The term ‘social’ can be omitted when defining a movement. The
extensive use of the term ‘social movement’ in comparison, for example,
to the ‘social group’, ‘social organization’ or ‘social family’ stems from
the connotation that the term ‘social’ not only describes social patterns
but more precisely also suggests something ‘good’ or ‘beautiful’.
However, this use is not supported by sociology. The use of the word
‘social’ in the terms ‘social movement’, ‘social organization’ or ‘social
group’ is therefore not wrong, but it is superfluous.
12It is not my intention to negate the notion that protest movements are
particularly prominent forms of movements. Rather than narrowing
down movements by definition through the concept of protest from the
outset, however, it seems more sensible to me to work with a broader
concept of movements and to understand Luhmann's contributions to
movements as contributions to the most prominent form of movements,
namely, the protest movement.
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movements have surprising similarities with political
movements, even if they rarely resort to the mode of pro-
test (see Barker, 1993). Movements can also be identified
in the field of education if we recall the reform pedagogi-
cal movement of the 20th century. Even if these move-
ments see themselves as a counter-concept to the
dominant form of school education, movements cannot
be reduced to a protest movement. But even for such
fields such as sports, we could discuss whether the soccer
fan scene has similarities with political or religious move-
ments (see Guilianotti, 2002).
In contrast to organizations, it is difficult in move-
ments to define the circle of members with precision (see
early discussions in the Germanophone world for exam-
ple Rammstedt, 1978, p. 134; Neidhardt, 1985: 194ff.).
Although in companies, administrations or schools, it is
easy to recognize who is a member and who is not, iden-
tifying members is more difficult in the antinuclear
movement, the peace movement, the women's move-
ment, the evangelical movement or the reform educa-
tional movement. In research, the problem of classifying
people is often solved by distinguishing the persons asso-
ciated with a movement into activists, participants and
sympathizers, whereby the activists and participants are
assigned to the movement, whereas the sympathizers are
assigned to the environment of the movement (for a
popular science discussion, see Rucht & Neidhardt, 2001,
p. 541).13 But instead of taking these difficulties of clear
classifications of people as an opportunity to speak of
‘relatively indefinite entities’ (Rucht & Neidhardt, 2001,
p. 540), it seems more productive to determine what
effects these difficulties have on the form of communica-
tion in movements.
If we abandon the concept of movement, which was
narrowed from the outset to the type of protest
movement, we cannot define movements solely through
protest communication (see Luhmann, 2013, p. 157).
Although there are also communications in religious
movements, in reform educational movements, in the
life reform movements or in movements of the economic
system that ‘are addressed to others calling on their sense
of responsibility’ (Luhmann, 2008b, p. 125), describing
this form of communication as the dominant one would
not correctly capture the character of these movements.
More generally, value communication can be described
as the dominant mode of communication. Friedhelm
Neidhardt rightly pointed out that ‘operationalizable pur-
poses’ and ‘action-structuring programmatics’ are not the
strength of social movements; this is why their purposes
are kept rather vague (Neidhardt, 1985, p. 195). Move-
ments, on the other hand, tend to communicate with
values.14 But even if values such as peace, environmental
protection, equality or charity play a central role as refer-
ence points for communication in movements, a refer-
ence to values is not sufficient. After all, it is the
characteristic of values that they can generate broad
approval in their general form. Today, peace, environ-
mental protection and equality (almost) all enjoy univer-
sal favour, at least in abstract terms. Values are therefore
formulated in movements in such a way that they can
also be mobilized. This can be done—as is often the case
in religious movements—by dramatizing a value as par-
ticularly important or, as movements in the business
world show, by ‘discovering’ new, previously under-
estimated values such as participation or self-realization.
A particularly suitable form—and this explains the
narrowing of the form of communication in systems
theory—is protest communication, because it can specify
a general value shared by most people, such as peace or
environmental protection, by setting it apart from others.
This is only one (albeit particularly plausible) opportu-
nity for specifying value communications in such a way
that they can be mobilized; however, it is not the
only one.
2.3 | Group
In sociology, when we talk about a group as a social sys-
tem, we mean a system in which people are in regular,
personal contact with each other. They are therefore also
referred to in the literature as ‘intimate groups’, ‘face-to-
face groups’ or ‘primary groups’. One can think of these
groups as rather ‘fluid’, ‘loosely connected’ groups, such
as a regularly touring travel company, a circle of friends,
cliques of adolescent youths, street gangs loitering on
street corners or neighbours who regularly meet in pubs
(Luhmann, 2020). But there are also ‘more stable forms’
such as ‘autonomous’ left-wing political groups with their
far-reaching demands on their members, small terrorist
groups such as the ‘Baader Meinhof Group’, or religious
groups that have developed beyond the initiative of
13See Guilianotti, 2002, where soccer fans are classified as ‘supporters,
followers, fans and flaneurs’, much like in research on movements.
14This thought is taken up in various theories of research on
movements. Consider the collective identity paradigm in movement
research, where it is assumed that community building must take place
in movements related to defined values in order for mobilization to take
place at all (see Melucci, 1995). However, I believe it is wrong to
understand values as a ‘control medium’ of movements. We might ask,
who is supposed to control whom here? The concept of communication
is better suited to describe the reproduction of social systems here; this
has become clear especially in the discussion of control theory.
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church administrators and in which personal topics can
also be discussed.15
Groups—unlike organizations—consist of a certain,
unmistakable circle of members who know each other,
which is why all of the group members notice when
another member is absent. A group does not automati-
cally disintegrate when people leave or join the group.
But groups have a very limited ability to compensate for
loss of people and to incorporate new people. New
entrants are observed from the point of view that their
arrival does not disrupt group cohesion, the personal ref-
erence of the group members.
This limited ability to substitute people, in combina-
tion with often implicit norms, means that the behaviour
of members in groups can be much more difficult to
condition than that of members in organizations. It is
true that norms for ‘right behaviour’ develop in groups,
just as they do in movements, organizations and families.
However, as a rule, these emerge rather incidentally. In
groups, unlike in organizations, there are no procedures
available to change or extend norms (see Tyrell, 1983a,
p. 80).16
In the communication of this system type—unlike
in organizations or movements—there is primarily a
‘personal orientation’ between the members
(Luhmann, 2008a: 21/3d27fc). ‘Personal orientation’ in
groups means that ‘personal communication’ is not only
‘permissible’ but can also be ‘expected’ and even
‘demanded’. This means that, in communication, good
‘personnel knowledge is required’ so that one can ‘assess
what the other can understand’ and what they cannot
understand (Luhmann, 2008a: 21/3d27fc2).17 Even if
personal communication is the dominant style of com-
munication, groups of course also have decision commu-
nications or protest communications, for example. But
this communication must ultimately always be justifiable
with a reference to a ‘personal orientation’.18
2.4 | Families
Because a personal orientation of communication also
prevails in families, families are often treated as a special
form of group (see, for example, Tyrell, 1983b). But mem-
bership in families plays a different role than in groups.
There are obviously two ways to become a member of a
family, and both ways must be used to create a family at
all: the formation of a relationship between usually
opposite-sex partners and the incorporation of children
either by birth or adoption. With the birth or adoption of
a child within the framework of a relationship, a new
family is ‘completely on the way’. ‘All necessary
positions—father, mother and child—are occupied, even
if this family may increase by more children (but no lon-
ger by more parents)’ (Hartmann Tyrell, 1983b, p. 364 in
an early definition, partly shaped by a normative picture
of the family; my own translation).
The definition of families that Tyrell (2008) later
propagated via a frequently risky coupling of partnership
and parenthood seems to be a further development of the
exaggeratedly harmonious representation of the father–
mother–child trinity. According to Alois Herlth and
Hartmann Tyrell, the logic of partnership is often quite
different from that of parenthood. In the family, these
two logics are coupled (Tyrell & Herlth, 1994: 1ff.; see
also Tyrell, 2008, p. 317).19 This division of the definition
of families into partnership on the one hand and
15Luhmann (Luhmann, 1964, p. 34) himself still seems to fluctuate in
this early enumeration. He introduces the examples in general—as a
‘law’ that living together depends on ‘the formation of relatively fixed
mutual expectations of behavior’ but then takes his examples from
small group research in the narrower sense.
16Unlike organizations, groups therefore find it difficult to develop
membership into a clearly defined ‘special role’ to which the fulfilment
of a number of decisive expectations can be linked (Tyrell, 2008, p. 303).
This makes it much more difficult to demand certain behavioural
expectations from a member of a group of friends, a street gang or a
prayer group by threatening imminent expulsion from the group than
from an employee in a company, a hospital or an administration.
17I collected the information on the keyword ‘group’ in Luhmann's
personal box of file-cards (Zettelkasten) in the course of an initial review
that was intended to enable me to assess the extent to which the notes
offer insights into topics that Luhmann had not taken up in
publications. The central references on the subject of groups under the
number 21/3d27fC are contradictory in that Luhmann develops the
basic features of a concept of a group as a social system over several
notes (quote: groups are ‘to be treated as a typology of system formation
that cannot be traced back to interaction, organization and society’),
and then, on the last note, in response to the proposals of Neidhardt
and Tyrell, he states succinctly that ‘groups should not be recognized as
a special type of social system’ but should only be understood as a
‘mode of interaction and accumulation of interaction’
(Luhmann, 2008a: 21/3d27fC5).
18Sociology has so far found it difficult to separate the concepts of
friendship dyads and groups of friends (see Tyrell, 1983a, whose concept
suggests that friendship between two persons also constitutes a group of
friends). My preliminary proposal is based on separating friendship
dyads from friendship groups. If you are a friend of a person (friendship
dyad), this does not mean that you are also a friend of their friend(s).
However, if you are friends with a friend (or friends) of a friend, there is
a high probability that a group will form in which the behaviour of the
members is influenced by a personal orientation.
19With its emphasis on the often opposing logics of partnership and
parenthood, this model distances itself from the concept of the nuclear
family with its ‘strong suggestion of unity’. With this interesting
thought, Tyrell opposes the widespread idea in the sociology of families
as a triad of mother, father and child (Tyrell, 2008, p. 317, in which the
corresponding references can also be found).
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parenthood on the other also makes it possible to view
families through the aspect of membership. In the case of
parenthood, memberships cannot blithely be terminated.
Children cannot simply be excluded from the family if
they do not behave according to their parents' needs. It is
also difficult for the children themselves to terminate
their family membership. Children are aware of this
impossibility of exclusion and take advantage of it with
spectacular resistance actions against their parents, espe-
cially at big family celebrations or in line at supermarket
checkouts. It is as if they think, what is going to
happen—it is not like they are going to leave me. In
partnerships, the dissolution of a membership is not just
conceivable; in modern society, at least, it is the rule.
Even if at first glance it seems that a relationship—
similar to membership in an organization—can be ‘ter-
minated’ (see Tyrell, 2008, p. 317), we must keep the spe-
cial character of partnerships in mind. In a relationship,
it is difficult to exert influence over the partner's behav-
iour by threatening him or her with separation. If one
partner makes the continuation of the partnership con-
tingent on the condition that the household is cleaned
regularly, that in the future the other partner will drive
more carefully, or that further amorous adventures with
other sex partners must cease, then there are already
clear signs of crisis at hand.
Despite (or perhaps better: precisely because of) this
fragile quality of membership, intimate communication in
families today is not just allowed to a surprisingly
high degree in comparison to premodern society but is
almost demanded (for a comprehensive and revealing
discussion, see Gilgenmann, 1994, p. 66; see also
Luhmann, 2005b, p. 213).20 Intimate communication
does not mean that communication in families is charac-
terized by the permanent flush of love. There would be
little empirical plausibility for this. Rather, intimate
communication means that ‘everything that concerns a
person’ is, in principle, ‘accessible for communication’.
According to Luhmann, secrecy can be practiced by par-
ents and children alike, ‘but it has no legitimate status’.
In the family, one cannot ‘reject communication about
oneself with the remark: that is none of your business!’
(Luhmann, 2005c, p. 193; my translation). Intimate
communication differs from personal communication—
the idea has not yet been worked out in systems theory—
in that intimate communication claims the ability to
thematize all other roles, whereas personal communica-
tion can only claim to thematize some other roles. In an
interaction among friends, a question about bizarre reli-
gious practices can be rejected, whereas in a relationship
between two people, not answering the question would
necessitate an explanation.21
2.5 | Similarities and differences
between organizations, groups, families
and movements
The common feature shared by organizations, groups,
families and movements is that they are constantly moni-
tored for whether a person making a contribution to
communication is treated as a member of the social sys-
tem or not. In contrast to the social system of society,
which is based on the principle of communicative acces-
sibility, membership refers to the distinction between
belonging and not belonging to a system. The lamenta-
tions of a dissatisfied person, the crying of a baby or the
throwing of a stone by a masked person—depending on
whether the person is regarded as a member or not—
therefore have a fundamentally different meaning for a
system. The distinction between members and nonmem-
bers thus functions as an ‘identification signal’ not only
of organizations but also of groups, movements and
families (on identification signals in organizations, see
Luhmann, 2008b, p. 188).22
Instead of understanding membership as a ‘universal
feature’ of all social systems, membership is introduced
here merely as a feature of a series of precisely specified
systems between interaction and society. Membership
alone is not suitable as a criterion for all social systems
because, in most societal subsystems, layman roles are
formed through which the ‘total population’ is included
20The idea that parenthood and partnership are assigned the same form
of communication may come as a surprise. After all, the term intimate
communication was originally used only for partnerships shaped by the
romantic ideal of love (Luhmann, 2012a) and then later extended to
families as a whole, including parenthood (Luhmann, 2005c). Even if
the semantics of partnership and parenthood are surprisingly
comparable at first glance (for example, the statement ‘I love you’,
which is used towards both children and partners), similarities and
differences in intimate communication in partnership and parenthood
need to be examined more closely (see Tyrell & Herlth, 1994: 6ff. on the
‘bourgeois semantics of unity’ (my translation), which is certainly
responsible for the similarity in the form of communication).
21The distinction between intimate communication and personal
communication has not yet been systematically elaborated. In this
respect, this is a provisional definition. The exclusivity claims conveyed
in communication would be of particular interest.
22So much for the idea that families, protest movements, professions or
even classes should be placed at the level of society. To do this, we
would have to prove the social function for each of these systems. This
may still be plausible with families or groups, but it becomes more
difficult with protest movements or professions. Or we would have to
explain why other systems besides the functional systems have to be
located on the level of society.
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in the respective social system located at the societal
macro level (Stichweh, 1988: 261ff.; see also
Luhmann, 1981, p. 157; Schirmer & Michailakis, 2018).
Social systems such as groups, families, movements or
organizations, on the other hand, include only a small
subset of the total population and can therefore distin-
guish between members and nonmembers (for organiza-
tions, see Luhmann, 1994, p. 193 or Luhmann, 2018,
p. 323; on the fundamental distinction between inclusion
and exclusion, see Luhmann, 1995a; Göbel &
Schmidt, 1998; Schirmer & Michailakis, 2018).23
However, as we have seen, the differences between
organizations, groups, families and movements are now
based on the fact that membership (and thus also non-
membership) is determined differently. In simple terms,
we can say that people in organizations become members
through decisions about entry and exit, in groups through
more and more regular participation (or even through
increasing abstinence) in interactions, in families by
means of birth and death, or in movements through
repeated identification with a value or through the
renunciation of an idea. Although in organizations mem-
bership is achieved through a combination of self-
selection (of the member) and external selection (of the
organization), movements do not—and groups only to a
limited extent—have the option of externally selecting
their members. In the case of families, on the other hand,
there is no option of self-selection or external selection,
at least for children and parents, but new members are
‘assigned’ at birth to a family.
There are certainly borderline cases again and
again—organizations in which, for example, one
becomes a ‘gradual’ member through freelance work,
groups that receive their members through initiation
rites, families in which the children ‘divorce’ from their
parents, or movements that try to condition the behav-
iour of their members—but these grey zones do not
speak against the distinction of organizations, move-
ments, groups and families. Just as the existence of twi-
light does not preclude the existence of day and night,
borderline cases do not disprove the existence of groups,
organizations, families and movements that can be dis-
tinguished from each other in principle.24
Because of the different ways of handling member-
ship, groups, movements, families and organizations
tend to produce different forms of communication: In
organizations, decision-making communication; in
groups, personal communication; in families, intimate
communication; and in movements, value communica-
tion. The emergence of type-specific forms of communi-
cation does not mean that communication in a social
system is exclusively in the respective specific form nor
that this form of communication is to be found
exclusively in the respective social system. Decisions are
sometimes made in families and groups, and there can
be moments of personal communication in movements
and organizations. But, following one of Luhmann's old
ideas, only in the respective social system does the
respective form of communication serve to reproduce
the respective social system.
3 | THE DIFFERENTIATION OF
GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS,
MOVEMENTS AND FAMILIES
A central idea of Luhmann's theory of society is that the
change from a segmented society to a stratified one to a
functionally differentiated society has led to an ‘increas-
ing … differentiation’ of the levels of interaction, organi-
zation and society. In segmentally differentiated archaic
social formations, according to Luhmann, interaction,
organization and society were ‘virtually identical’. An
archaic tribal society consists of ‘all those interactions
that are visible and accessible to individual members of
the tribe’. It ejects—like ‘an organization’—people ‘who
are not sufficiently accommodating’ and ‘recruits’ people
‘chiefly through marriage’. (Luhmann, 1982, p. 77) In the
stratified society of advanced civilizations, the ‘the nar-
row boundaries of interaction accessible to on-the-scene
individuals’ is surpassed. In the urban centres, organiza-
tions were formed in particular ‘for religious, political,
military, and commercial functions and for specialized
productive tasks’. Because, however, ‘the influence of
organizations on daily life was still relatively slight and,
conversely, society itself was still conceived as “a political
organization”, as a cooperation capable of action’, it is
not yet possible to speak of a complete differentiation of
the levels of interaction, organization and society
(Luhmann, 1982, p. 78). This only formed with the emer-
gence of a functionally differentiated society. Society
23Even in interactions it does not make sense to distinguish between
members and nonmembers. Surely it is true that one ‘belongs’ to an
interaction by taking part in a fight, a verbal argument or a discussion.
But this affiliation is more (intentional or unintentional) participation
and is therefore viewed differently than membership in groups,
organizations, families and movements (comments on undifferentiated
inclusions in interactions). It seems more plausible to me that
interactions are often observed in a differentiated way as to the extent to
which participants in the interaction belong to a group, organization,
family or movement. In any case, we perceive the screaming of our own
baby differently than the cries of someone else's child.
24It is interesting to see how the respective systems deal with the fact
that they are approached by other forms of membership management.
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could then neither be understood ‘as the aggregate sum
of daily personal encounters’ nor as a ‘uniformed organi-
zation’ (Luhmann, 1982, pp. 77–78).
How must this part of Luhmann's social theory,
described here in close reference to his own formulations,
be modified if different systems such as movements,
groups, organizations and families are located between
interaction and society?
3.1 | Profiling groups, movements,
organizations and families as social
systems against each other
Looking back from the vantage point of typical modern
social systems to segmented or stratified societies is
problematic. We can certainly point out that segmented
societies and stratified societies (similar to modern orga-
nizations) reject people who do not want to submit, but
this exhausts the analytical possibilities for comparison.
In this respect, we must be careful to use social systems
that are typical for modern society, such as protest move-
ments, organizations, groups of friends or families con-
sisting of only one parent and children, for the analysis of
segmented or stratified societies. It is rather interesting to
see how organizations, movements, groups and families
have developed as separate types of social systems in the
transition to a functionally differentiated society. It was
only with the separation from a social formation charac-
terized by tribal and class affiliation that it became possi-
ble for individuals to differentiate more strongly between
memberships in different and mutually independent
social systems. In the following, I will briefly show that
the differentiation of movements, organizations, groups
and families as separate system types has taken place
largely in parallel and has at least partly mutually condi-
tioned these types.25
An important foundation of the emergence of organi-
zations already existed at a time in which religious com-
munities developed into religious associations that
recruited their members on the basis of their own deci-
sions and—in contrast to what came before—
independently of ascriptive criteria such as family affilia-
tion, class affiliation or ethnic roots (see Parsons, 1964:
347ff.). However, we can only begin to identify a differen-
tiation of organizations across different social fields as a
separate system type from the 16th and 17th centuries
onwards. Only when politics, law and economy separated
from religion did organizations develop in these fields
that could make decisions about their memberships in an
increasingly autonomous manner. With industrialization
in particular, wage labour increasingly differentiated
itself as a specific role freed from all other expectations.
An increasingly dominant model emerged in which
membership in an organization was based on a conscious
decision by both the member and the organization itself
and, at the same time, members—with the exception of
total organizations—were no longer integrated into an
organization with all of their role references (see
Lieckweg & Wehrsig, 2001: 39ff.).
Sometime after the emergence of organizations as dis-
tinctive systems, movements developed into a distinctive
system type in their own right. Despite some prominent
precursors in the form of religious collective movements
in the Middle Ages, it was not until the second half of the
18th century—the French Revolution, for example—that
movements established themselves as ‘a normal phenom-
enon in the self-observation of the societal system’
(Luhmann, 1995b, p. 398).26 Although the term ‘move-
ment’ also existed before the French Revolution, it was
generally used to describe the rebellions, revolts and
protests that peasants and smallholders instigated, with
reference to a morality embedded in class society, to
secure their standard of living, which was often just
above the subsistence level (Luhmann, 2008b,
pp. 129–132). It was not until the French Revolution that
the concept of a movement was given the connotation of
something ‘goal-oriented,’ ‘permanent’ or ‘socially
anchored’ (Raschke, 1988, p. 23; my translation).
The distinction of families as a system in their own
right also falls into this period of transition from a strati-
fied society to a functionally differentiated one. In the tra-
dition of Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, the
differentiation of families can be described as a transition
of the family from a multifunctional to a unifunctional
system. According to Burgess and Locke (1945 vii; my
translation), educational, economic, religious and medi-
cal functions in modern society are increasingly trans-
ferred to specialized institutions, whereas the family is
25The differentiation of groups, movements, organizations and families
in the transition from a stratified to a functionally differentiated society
is presented in this article primarily with reference to system-theoretical
considerations. The argument of the distinction of these social systems
has, however, been well elaborated in sociology in general more
(families or organizations) or less (groups), so that it is easy to offer a
description even without reference to system theory. The exact
description of the largely parallel differentiation of group, organization,
movement and family will be provided in a separate article.
26In stratified societies there were revolts, riots and protests that often
unfolded in violation of normative expectations determined by tradition
(Luhmann, 2008b, pp. 129–132).
27According to Luhmann, ‘the original families were connected
symbolically only by the married couple's children, only for this tie to
become ever so thin once the children in turn married.’
(Luhmann, 2012a, p. 145).
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primarily based on ‘mutual affection’, ‘compassionate
understanding’ and the ‘communal feeling of its mem-
bers’. Because political, religious and economic functions
are increasingly fulfilled outside the family, there is no
need—and this is a central idea—to take into account the
family connections of the respective partner when marry-
ing (Luhmann, 2012a, pp. 145–154.).27 So whereas in the
stratified society, the ‘family was still seen as a unity that
survived the change of generations’, to which servants
and employees were often seen as belonging as well,
every marriage in the functionally differentiated
society—indeed, every choice of partnership—holds the
potential for the new foundation of a family (see
Luhmann, 2012a, p. 129).28
The differentiation of groups ‘as a special kind of sys-
tem formation’ also takes place in the phase of transition
from a stratified to a functionally differentiated society
(Luhmann, 2008a: 21/3d27fC2; my translation). Indeed,
already in societies distinguished along segmental and
strata lines, we see relationships between two or more
persons that remind us of the modern phenomenon of
friendship. Just think of the blood brotherhoods and
sworn friendships that can be found in some early cul-
tures. However, the idea of groups (of friends) did not
develop in the Western world until the 18th century (see
the informative analysis in Schmidt, 2007; for an early
semantic analysis of German literature, see Rasch, 1936).
We can understand the function of groups that place high
demands on personal relationships as a compensation
mechanism for the increasing absence of ‘identification
groups in society as a whole’ as functional differentiation
continues (Tenbruck, 1964: 446ff.).29 The perceived
intensity in groups of friends is then understood as a
reaction to the impersonal role-based relationships that
dominate society (Kern, 2008, p. 17).30
A proposition that deserves further inquiry is that, in
the process of differentiation, the different system types
of groups, movements, families and organizations ‘set
themselves off from one another more sharply’ as distinct
system types (see the formulation in Luhmann, 1982,
p. 78 for interaction, organization and society).
Luhmann's argument—that in the context of interaction
systems ‘concrete capacity for human empathy and
thoughtful awareness of others’ (in the form, for example,
of intimate relations) can be ‘enhanced in an extraordi-
nary and unprecedented way’ when the interaction ‘is no
longer freighted with society-integrating expectations of
“normality”’ (Luhmann, 1982, p. 79)—must primarily be
traced back to the differentiation between family-specific
and group-specific interaction (and not the interaction
per se).31 And the ‘organizational specification of behav-
iour’ can also be enormously increased, if organizations
no longer generally refrain from religious activities, polit-
ical attitudes, athletic preferences or friendship loyalties
of the organizational member, but also do not have to
take into consideration the loyalties of the members in
groups, movements or families.
3.2 | Subsequent problems of
differentiating movements, groups,
organizations and families
Whenever we speak of the differentiation of families,
groups, organizations and movements, we can of course
understand it as the differentiation of these systems vis-á-27According to Luhmann, ‘the original families were connected
symbolically only by the married couple's children, only for this tie to
become ever so thin once the children in turn married.’
(Luhmann, 2012a, p. 145).
28I consider the differentiation of the family in modern society to be a
model case for demonstrating the strength of this approach. In systems-
theory orthodoxy, the family is located only at the societal–theoretical
level. The problem of the ‘alienation of the individual’ arises in modern
society ‘across the board’ and could only be solved by differentiating a
functional system by the name of ‘family’. Instead, I propose, in
coordination with the general sociology of families, that in the
transition from a stratified to a functionally differentiated society, we
should establish a distinction of families as separate social systems. Of
course, the individual families fulfil an important social function in
reducing the ‘alienation of the individual’, but, similar to organizations
or groups, they are to be understood in a multireferential way, because,
for example, they also have connections to functional systems of
upbringing (in the upbringing of children and—with some exceptions—
also of life partners) or the economy (as a consumer or sometimes even
production community). This multireferentiality of families as social
systems cannot be recognized by locating families as functional systems.
29Tenbruck points out that it is interesting, from the point of view of
gender sociology, that friendship was regarded as a ‘matter for men’.
His explanation is that the social position of women was limited to
house and family.
30Few studies have addressed the role that the tension in the personal
relationship between two persons (dyad) and in the personal
relationship between three or more persons (group) plays in the
differentiation process. Although we know from the work of Georg
Simmel that ‘the third party’—and then of course also the fourth, fifth
or sixth—gives a social system its own dynamic (Simmel, 1992: 63ff.),
the role played by the alternative between dyad and group formation in
the differentiation of personal relationships has so far not received
much attention. Even if the transitions from a (friend) dyad to a (friend)
group are fluid, there is much to be said for focusing on the differences.
Unlike a dyad, a group does not disintegrate automatically when people
drop out or join.
31Likewise, person-centred interaction in groups has only become
possible because the group has also emancipated itself from demands
made on group members by organizations, families and movements.
The statement, ‘I am now going to watch sports shows with my buddies
as usual’ may meet with protest from families and also from employers,
but it shows the formation of the group's own logic.
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vis society, completely in the sense of Luhmann's original
intention.32 Unlike in stratified societies, it is generally
not possible to use a social position to derive any claims
for a position in organizations, families, movements or
groups. Even the daughter of an influential industrial
manufacturer has to live with the fact that she does not
occupy an exceptional position in her circle of friends, in
the family she has founded, in a political movement or in
the organization employing her.33
For our purposes, however, we are primarily inter-
ested in the fact that groups, movements, organizations
and families in modern society also differentiate them-
selves more strongly from one another. Often without
explicitly communicating this, we learn that groups,
movements, organizations and families follow very differ-
ent logics. Socrates still assumed quite naturally for the
stratified society that the demands on the leadership of a
family and an army were similar; he claimed this was
because it was important to make subordinates obedient
and to obey, to punish the bad, to honour the good and
to arouse in subordinates a good ethos (Xenophon, 1789:
111f.). However, if a father or a mother in modern society
assumed such a position, it would cause irritation to say
the least.34 The young person who wants to be treated in
an organization as in a family will presumably be
regarded with the same scepticism as the manager who
wants to lead his family like an organization (see
Dreeben, 1968 for the first case).
Although the self-descriptions of families, groups,
movements and organizations often emphasize the
compatibility of membership in one's own system with
membership in other systems—as in ‘we are a family-
friendly company’—sociology tends to emphasize the
tensions arising from the fact that people are exposed to
the demands of different social systems. Although the
collisions between movements, groups, organizations and
families are empirically of different relevance and have
therefore been researched to different extents in sociolog-
ical research, they should at least be briefly mentioned to
point out all possible combinations of group, movement,
organization and family.
The self-descriptions of movements often contain
statements that, on the one hand, indicate the movement
is dependent on organization(s), and, on the other hand,
they are postulates of organizations that, in their own
understanding, suggest they are ultimately only
instruments of the movement (see Etzioni, 1975: 121ff.).
However, sociological research on movement organiza-
tions has shown that tensions develop between move-
ments and ‘their’ organizations (see Raschke, 1988:
206f.). Friedhelm Neidhardt even views the tension
between the system logics of movements and organiza-
tions as the central dilemma of movements. If move-
ments become organizations—or if they rely primarily on
organizations—then they lose their ‘attractive character’;
they do not become organizations, but run the risk of
being ‘fragmented or rolled over’ (see Neidhardt, 1985,
p. 202).
Whereas tensions between movements and organiza-
tions are relatively well studied, the relationship between
movement and family plays a subordinate role in socio-
logical research. This is certainly due to the fact that
movements that make demands on the organization of
family life—such as the kibbutz movement in Israel—
are rather rare. The cases in which the demands of fami-
lies compete with the demands of movements—for
example, over time resources—are certainly more empir-
ically relevant. However, because involvement in move-
ments is often only temporary, such collisions are rarely
found.
Also, the relationships between movements and
groups focused on personal communication have so far
received comparatively little attention. This is surprising
in that one can assume that not only are circles of friends
formed within the framework of movements but that
membership in a circle of friends is also an important
motive for involvement in a movement. If your own fri-
ends get involved in the peace movement or the women's
movement, it is likely that you will do so as well. Con-
flicts always seem to arise when a group—often clustered
around couples or circles of friends—becomes politically
more radical than the movement (see Neidhardt's insight-
ful case study, 1982: 320ff.).
32The position of a person in his/her layman role, for example, in a
legal, educational, economic, political or religious system, is not
determined by these affiliations to groups, families, organizations or
movements. Contact with a prominent clique of friends, a well-
connected family, a protest movement or an influential organization
may help, but it does not spare you a traffic ticket from a policeman,
bad grades from a teacher or warnings from your doctor. And if it is
possible to negotiate a bonus with police officers, teachers or doctors
with reference to belonging to families, movements, organizations or
groups, this is generally judged critically when it becomes known.
33I cannot deal here with the consequence that interaction, as a social
system with its own logic, also differentiates itself from groups, families,
organizations and movements. The sociological research on interactions
in groups, interactions in families, interactions in movements and
interactions in organizations, which is both empirically guided and
theoretically classified, is rather underdeveloped (but see, for example,
on interaction in families, Keppler, 1994: 23ff. or for interaction in
organizations, Kieserling, 1994: 168ff.). What seems to be largely
missing are comparative studies on interactions in movements, groups,
families and organizations.
34In his dialogue with Socrates, Nicomachides expressed doubts even
then. Of course, Socrates' position is based on a fundamentally different
understanding of family. Accordingly, in the German translation of the
Xenophon of 1789, the word ‘household’, not ‘family’, is used for ‘Oikos’
(see Xenophon, 1789, p. 112).
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In the research literature, the area of tension between
‘families and organizations’ has been worked out most
extensively. Although in the course of the differentiation
of organizations such as armies, companies and schools
in the military, educational and economic texts it has
repeatedly been pointed out that membership in these
organizations was of course compatible with membership
in a family, the field of tension between organization and
family is depicted precisely in sociological descriptions.
The tensions between schools and families over the edu-
cational sovereignty of pupils (see Dreeben, 1968), the
disputes between armies and families over access to
young adults (see Shils & Janowitz, 1948) and the debates
in companies about ‘work-life balance’, which usually
revolve around the question of balancing the demands of
organizations and families, are only particularly promi-
nent examples in which the tensions that have arisen as
a result of the differentiation of organization and family
are addressed.
In the relationship between group and organization,
too, it was initially assumed that the relationship would
be more productive for both the group and the organiza-
tion. In the early experiments on Taylorist work organi-
zation, inspired by social psychology, the group was
conceived, in contrast to the organization, as a stronghold
of humanity. Very quickly, however, this contrast was
supplanted by the hypothesis that organizations should
promote, not just passively humour, the principle of the
formation of groups, because this would simultaneously
promote job satisfaction and productivity. Only slowly
did sociological research come to the conclusion that—if
groups and organizations are understood as systems with
their own logics—a harmonious interaction of groups
and organizations is rather unlikely (see Moldaschl &
Weber, 1998).35
The system types of family and group came into con-
tact with each other in the form of claims based on
‘romantic love’ in the partnership and in the form of
groups based on claims for ‘sensitive friendship’.36
Certainly, as Johannes Schmidt (2007, p. 120) has pointed
out, one can assume a ‘diachronic complementary rela-
tionship’ in the training of friendship and love semantics,
but in the case of contact between groups and families,
role conflicts of individual persons can also frequently
occur. We need not only think of the split loyalties of a
parental couple to the family on the one hand and to a
group of friends on the other hand, but we can also see
the conflict in the example of children and the competing
demands of socialization by the clique of friends and of
upbringing by the family, which are inculcated in
children.
3.3 | The system perspective
Because groups, families, movements and organizations
are systems based on the determination of membership
(or nonmembership) of individuals, the interplay of sys-
tem types can be viewed in the light of the tried and
tested presentation of role conflicts in sociology. The
basic idea is always that modern society differentiates
between different social systems, each with its own
requirements. In exceptional cases, a single role may
dominate a person—for example, if a person is exclu-
sively a father, movement activist, organizational mem-
ber or good buddy—but the rule is that role requirements
are brought to a person by different systems.
However, a systems theoretical perspective need not
be limited to the formulation of role conflicts. Instead, it
can systematically examine how the different social sys-
tems relate to each other. The possibilities for such ana-
lyses will be explained in the following.
4 | NESTING, COMBINATIONS
AND TRANSITIONS
It is one of the well-known pathologies of systems theory
that considerable energy is devoted to bringing new
social systems into conversation without, however, show-
ing how the definition of a new system with its limits, its
operations and its codes changes the sociological descrip-
tion that ennobles the social phenomenon as a system. In
a discussion of different social systems between interac-
tion and society, the challenge is therefore not simply to
proclaim the existence of such social systems but to show
what additional cognitive possibilities can be gained by
distinguishing between families, organizations, move-
ments and groups.
In the following, we will use a theoretical tool that
Luhmann used in his article on interaction, organization
and society. The point of Luhmann's (1982, p. 85) differ-
entiation between interaction, organization and society
was not (only) that, on the basis of the mechanisms of
‘self-selection and boundary-formation’, different ‘types
35Interestingly, the literature focuses primarily on the relationship
between groups and organizations in the form of groups ‘in’
organizations. This is obvious because groups, unlike organizations, are
limited in their size. But it would be interesting to look at those
organizational phenomena that occur when the group and the
organization are largely the same size.
36See also the informative discussion in Schmidt, 2007 (p. 120). Also
interesting are—as far as I can judge, better investigated—relationships
between the often very far-reaching claims of the parent–child
relationship (the subsystem of parenthood in the family) and the claims
from the peer groups of friends to which the children belong.
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of social system’ are distinguished and their differentia-
tion is presented in the course of ‘sociocultural evolu-
tion’, but that we can assess how social systems are
related to each other.37 The background for this perspec-
tive is that social systems do not have to be mutually
exclusive, because communications can always be attrib-
uted to several systems at the same time. According to
one of Luhmann's seminal quotes, ‘social systems … are
not necessarily mutually exclusive—as are things in
space.’ (Luhmann, 1982, p. 86) On the one hand, a
‘faculty meeting, for example, is an interaction system in
its own right, with a short history and its own unique
horizon of possibilities and series of choices’. But it is at
the same time ‘a system in an organization that, in turn,
is a suborganization in a larger organization that, in turn,
belongs to the educational sub-system of society’.
(Luhmann, 1982, p. 86).
Because of the differentiation of interaction, organiza-
tion and society on three levels, Luhmann almost inevita-
bly had to think of the principle of nesting in the
relationships between these three systems. According to
Luhmann, ‘every interaction and every organization also
belongs to society, and an interaction can (although it
need not) belong to an organization’ (Luhmann, 1982,
p. 86). We can now, completely in this context, also ima-
gine nesting between groups, movements, organizations
and families. We need only consider groups with strongly
personal communication, which are parasitically formed
in organizations, or of political movements in which pro-
test organizations differentiate themselves. Because com-
munications can belong to several systems at the same
time, it is also conceivable that groups, organizations,
movements and families are not nested together but are
interwoven without one of these being necessarily pri-
mary. But it is also conceivable—in contrast to the levels
of distinction between interaction, organization and
society—that a system changes its system type, for exam-
ple, if a protest movement ‘degenerates’ at some point
into a publicly sponsored protest organization, or if a
group of friends becomes a profit-oriented organization
in which hardly anyone remembers that the founders of
the organization were once friends. Without claiming to
elaborate on forms of nesting, combination and transi-
tions here in greater detail, the following will illustrate
the possible insights that such a research programme
could yield.
4.1 | Nesting
Although groups, movements, organizations and families
are analytically equal in rank between interaction and
organization, they can also be nested within each other.
In organizations that impose formal membership condi-
tions, groups can form that not only focus on enforcing
informal expectations but also address personal issues far
beyond the organization.38 Within the framework of a
movement, a large number of organizations can be
formed that define themselves as part of the movement
in their self-descriptions.
Although in distinguishing between interactions,
organizations and societies we can only imagine one
direction of nesting—for example, only interactions in
organizations, but not organizations in interactions—the
systems of group, organization, movement and family
can theoretically be nested in both directions. We can
imagine organizations that employ families, but also fam-
ilies that run an organization, for example, in the form of
a restaurant. It is possible to imagine groups that are
formed within the framework of organizations, but also
groups from which an organization—for example, a polit-
ical organization or an enterprise—emerges. But because
of the different possibilities of the different types of sys-
tems to expand their membership numbers, some nes-
tings are of course more likely than others (see
Geser, 1980 on the sociology of small systems).39
The core idea of level differentiation is that the ‘super-
ordinate’ system does not determine the ‘subordinate’ sys-
tem. In organizations, (informal) groups are formed,
which are naturally influenced by the organizations, but
which can also have their own logic (in the framework of
which we can identify interactions that are also subject to
their own logic). Within the framework of protest move-
ments, both groups of friends and protest organizations
37In this respect, the multilevel approach, which is in vogue under the
buzzword of ‘governance’, especially in political science and also in
educational science, is ‘cold coffee’ for systems theoreticians. Especially
the postulate of a development from ‘systems theory to a multilevel
theory’ can only be explained with rudimentary knowledge of systems
theory, because Luhmann's system theory has always been a multilevel
theory.
38Groups must not be confused with teams, departments or working
groups (the latter are formal subsystems of organizations). In individual
cases, teams and groups may coincide, for example, when a semi-
autonomous work team in the automotive industry is identical to a
group of friends. However, sociological studies on power processes in
semi-autonomous work teams make this seem rather unlikely (see
Kühl, 2020).
39Such proposals for the insertion of further levels gain their plausibility
by taking the different size possibilities of the system types as an
opportunity to suspect nesting. Because it is difficult for groups to have
more than 30 or 40 members because of the need to know each other's
personalities, it makes sense to place them at a ‘lower’ level than
organizations whose membership size is in principle not limited
(of course, the number of people alone cannot provide information
about the complexity of a social system). Although these different sizes
make some nesting (e.g., groups ‘in’ organizations or organizations ‘in’
movements) more likely than others or even completely unlikely
(e.g., movements ‘in’ families), it is not necessary to imagine just one
type of nesting.
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are formed, which are not simply subsystems of the pro-
test movement but are also shaped by the specific mecha-
nisms of groups and organizations. According to
Luhmann, system formations on different levels are
mutually presupposed that ‘cannot be traced back to one
another, but are independent and irreplaceable through
their respective style of reduction’ (Luhmann, 1972b; my
translation; see also Tyrell, 2008, p. 306).
4.2 | Combinations
The classic attempt to expand the schema of interaction,
organization and society arises from the effort to insinu-
ate new ‘candidates’ as an additional level. Thus, as
described above, a prominent suggestion by Hartmann
Tyrell is to weave in groups as the fourth level between
interaction and organization and then treat groups of fri-
ends and families as two different types of groups (espe-
cially Tyrell, 1983a, 1983b). This is linked to the view
held in group sociology that groups occupy a mediating
position between individuals and organizations but also,
for example, between strata (Willke, 1978, p. 343; for the
sociology of group, see the particularly relevant discus-
sion in Dunphy, 1972: 32ff.).
Because communications can belong to several sys-
tems at the same time, it is also conceivable that groups,
organizations, movements and families are not nested in
each other but are interwoven without the primacy of a
social system. Just think of a family starting a business.
As long as the family does not hire any additional
employees, neither familial nor organizational logic will
dominate. Even face-to-face organizations, which are
now comparatively well researched, are often character-
ized by the fact that the members of a group of friends
are quite similar to the members of a small business. If
we look at the experiments with residential groups in
which children live, eat and are even raised together, it is
difficult to say whether group logic or family logic domi-
nates. The examples of the socialist movement or the
anti-globalization movement show that there are such
strong overlaps with organizations that the movement is
almost identical to an—more or less strongly
formalized—organization. Whether it is then more the
principle of the movement or more the principle of the
organization that takes the lead can only be tested
empirically.
4.3 | Transitions
One effect of the limitation to a few system types below
the societal level has been that the change from one
system type to another has so far neither been particu-
larly strongly empirically investigated nor meaningfully
conceived in theoretical terms. For example, it is not yet
clear how it can be conceived theoretically if, for exam-
ple, a group becomes an organization or a movement
only continues to exist in the form of an organization
financed by taxes or donations.40 Such a theory cannot
and should not be provided here, but at least it should be
shown which theoretical challenges exist.
One can imagine different forms of transitions from
one system type to another. Just think of a circle of fri-
ends who originally met to tinker with computers and
then became the core of a fast-growing business; a
neighbourhood group that got politically involved and
increasingly became a political lobby organization with
its own statutes, membership lists and membership regu-
lations; or a clique of soccer hooligans, who originally
regularly arranged an honest ‘fifteen against fifteen’
meeting with opposing fans, who—as was customary in
Great Britain in the 1980s—then developed into a group
in which members received a membership card and paid
monthly dues, which were used to pay the fines imposed
by the courts on individual members (see Allan, 1989).41
Movements can also become organizations by first yield-
ing parties, trade unions, churches or lobby organizations
(see Rammstedt, 1978: 167ff.), which then remain as rem-
nants, even if the movements themselves are no longer
perceptible as movements.42 A movement can dissolve
because its theme can no longer mobilize enough people,
but the organizations that were founded within the
framework of the movement can continue to exist
because, for example, they are able to pay the members
of the organization working there through donations or
subsidies (see Hellmann, 2002: 30ff.).
These transitions from one type of system to another
are particularly noticeable when another type of system
becomes an organization. Groups, movements or families
are increasingly developing criteria for membership,
40Thus, it is an interesting empirical research perspective on how a
group is formed from the concatenation of face-to-face interactions,
which shapes future interactions through its system history and, for
example, also notices and tolerates the temporary absence of individual
interaction partners.
41But of course, the organization can also degenerate into a clique again
if, for example, the members became uncontrollable, landed constantly
in detention and tore deep holes in the club's coffers with their
tendency to run amok.
42These organizations are often spun out of a movement to increase
their power. Neidhardt (1985: 194) states that movements with ‘this
development jump into a new type of system’, ‘which behaves
differently outwardly and inwardly’ (my translation).
43From my point of view there is the option of looking at the prolific
research about associations with a new focus.
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raising awareness of these criteria among members and
aligning their behaviour with increasingly clearly formu-
lated membership conditions.43 In principle, a reverse
process is also conceivable, for example, if a formerly
tightly organized political organization only continues to
exist as the core of a movement or if a formerly economi-
cally successful small enterprise continues as a group of
friends after its bankruptcy. But there is much to suggest
that such scenarios are the exception rather than
the rule.
5 | CONCLUSION
In addition to the organizations, groups, families or
movements mentioned here, one could imagine other
social systems located between interaction and society.
One only has to think of professions, communities, strata
or even networks in which the membership of persons is
also attributed to a system. Even though the proposal to
modify the Luhmann model is illustrated here using only
organizations, groups, families or movements, there is no
reason why this list should not be extended. The system
types between interaction and society—just like societal
subsystems—are not a closed list, but it is very conceiv-
able that in the course of social evolution, further systems
have developed, which are based on the determination of
membership or nonmembership of people.
The proposal presented here must prove itself against
the rescue strategies of the threefold scheme of interac-
tion, organization and society mentioned in Section 1. In
principle, as shown above, it would be possible to trace
all social systems—including groups, movements, fami-
lies, professions or strata—back to the three basic types
of interaction, organization or society if they were only
sufficiently broad. In this first rescue strategy of the
interaction–organization–society scheme, however, the
dominance of the respective system logic would have to
be proven. For example, it would have to be shown that
groups, much like weekly encounters with a specific
supermarket vendor, are merely a series of face-to-face
interactions and can be sufficiently explained by the logic
of the social system interaction, and that the processes
between the interactions—for example, e-mails between
group members, meetings of only individual group
members—merely represent framework conditions of the
interactions. If, to give another example, we want to
locate families as an independent system at the
macrolevel of society, one must not only point out one (!)
specific social function of families but also prove that the
individual family is also its own social system, which can-
not be explained solely by its social function.44
The second rescue strategy described above seems
more plausible, consisting of defining a multitude of phe-
nomena as social but without calling them a ‘social sys-
tem’. It is credible, for example, that competition or
imitation are not a ‘special type of social system’, because
the competitors or the imitators do not have to communi-
cate with each other, but of course it is a relevant ‘social
experience’ that has to be grasped and analysed by
sociology (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 382 connecting to
Simmel, 1992, p. 324); this argument has to my knowl-
edge not yet been elaborated for imitation. But this argu-
mentation, which makes sense for a number of social
phenomena, does not seem particularly plausible to me
for groups, movements or organizations, because for
communication consisting of information, utterance and
understanding can be proven without a problem, and
clear boundaries can be identified with which communi-
cation can be clearly attributed to the respective social
system.
The third rescue strategy seems least plausible,
namely, to justify the limitation to the tripartite scheme
of interaction, organization and society, with its ‘theoreti-
cally aesthetic’ advantages. Certainly, Luhmann has
impressively shown how a complex theory of evolution of
society can be formulated on just a few pages with the tri-
partite schema alone. But there is nothing to be said
against taking advantage of the analytical opportunities
that can be tapped by extending the schema. Thus, it is
especially important for a theory of the evolution of soci-
ety to work out to what extent the differentiations of
groups, movements, families and organizations ran paral-
lel in the transition from a stratified to a functionally dif-
ferentiated society and to what extent the differentiations
were mutually conditioned.
Certainly, a deep level of analysis could also be
achieved by assuming a very broad concept of organiza-
tion. Groups, families, movements, but also, for example,
associations, administrations or companies, would then
43From my point of view there is the option of looking at the prolific
research about associations with a new focus.
44I believe that the view that, in contrast to the proposal presented here,
the theory of society ensures that the ‘admission’ and ‘non-admission’ of
very different systems are controlled is only correct to a limited extent.
Certainly, the distinction between tribal societies, stratification societies
and functionally differentiated societies leads to the fact that a number
of systems can be assigned via three forms of differentiation:
‘segmentary’, ‘stratified’ and ‘functional’. But it is precisely the
candidates of movement, family, organization and group discussed here,
as well as other candidates such as profession, that have not yet been
just as systematically integrated into the social-theoretical scheme as,
for example, tribes in a segmentally differentiated society, an upper
class in a stratified society, or the political system in a functionally
differentiated society.
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all be regarded as organizations, which, however, can be
differentiated by a different degree of formalization. On
the basis of these merely gradual distinctions, the nes-
tings, transitions and combinations described above
would not be understood as nestings, transitions and
combinations between different kinds of social systems
but between different organizations. This approach would
be obvious in so far as, as we have shown, transitions
between groups, families and organizations are fluid (and
not imposed by a decision) and attributions are not
always simple.
At first glance, it may seem arbitrary whether one
works with a very broad concept of types of social sys-
tems and then allows for a multitude of subtypes of inter-
action and organization or whether one distinguishes a
multitude of different social systems between interaction
and society. After all, one can either aim for similarities
(all social systems are similar in that they are based on
system boundaries) or differences (even unsociable inter-
actions as a special form of communication among those
present can still be divided into different types). The
argument is, however, that in groups, movements, fami-
lies and organizations, we are dealing not only with dif-
ferent manifestations of the same social system type but
with different system types, each of which has its own
communication styles, demarcation mechanisms and
forms of structure formation.
Overall, however, it is possible to perform more com-
plex analyses when working with several types of social
systems between interaction and society because the
interaction of social systems can be observed more
closely. For example, the weakness of group sociology in
the 1960s was that it did not systematically distinguish
between interaction and group because it declared virtu-
ally all interaction phenomena to be group phenomena
(see Kruse, 1972). The system-theoretical sociology of
interaction has repeated this approach with reversed
signs by interpreting all group phenomena only as
repeated interactions (see Kieserling, 1999). But only if
one starts from different system logics of interactions and
groups and considers the different nestings, one comes to
adequate descriptions.45 Also for the analysis of organiza-
tions, it is a workaround to replace the identification of
informality primarily by group phenomena (see
Luhmann, 1964: 314ff.; and his critical comments in the
fourth edition of 1999, p. 399) simply by an identification
through interaction (see Luhmann, 2018, p. 9).46 Further-
more, to give a last example, it makes sense not to let
the description of movements and organizations col-
lapse into one system type, because only in this way
the tensions between movements, to which everyone
can declare himself to be a member, and the organiza-
tions with their clear membership conditions become
clear.
The fertility of the approach presented here lies in the
fact that it opens up a whole series of new questions for
the theory of society. How was the parallel differentiation
in modern society between organizations with member-
ship, groups oriented towards personal communication,
movements oriented towards protest communication and
families with severely restricted functions? What are the
transitions, combinations and nesting between the differ-
ent social systems and how have they changed in the
course of modern society? Research on such questions
remains in its infancy.
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